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This thesis explores the rising costs of Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) in 
the United States Navy.  In today’s defense budget environment, meeting the costs of 
these escalating requirements is a daunting task.  AT/FP requirements being placed upon 
ships and shore installations amount to much more than just an “increased awareness” of 
the terrorist threat.  New equipment must be purchased and distributed, new training must 
be developed, scheduled and attended, and the list goes on.  The Department of Defense 
(DOD) has redefined the very nature of what “Force Protection” means. 
In the Navy, Type Commanders (TYCOMs) fund the operations of all ships under 
their command.  They must forecast operational costs and budget for them.  The costs of 
meeting the escalating nature of AT/FP requirements placed upon ships makes this an 
inherently more difficult and complex task.  While the TYCOM is not responsible for 
funding all of these new requirements, he is responsible for a portion of them.  His ability 
to capture, forecast and analyze the nature of these rising costs will become increasingly 
important as he attempts to accurately budget for them. 
Ships operations funding includes separate accounts for the following shipboard 
cost pools: 
· Temporary Assigned Duty (TAD) – used to cover the costs of sending 
crewmembers away for training, for instance 
· Repair Parts – for the repair of equipment, and parts used while 
performing routine maintenance 
· Other – “consumable” dollars the ship uses for office supplies, cleaning 
equipment and the like 
· Utilities – electrical power, sewage removal, and potable (fresh) water 
· Fuel – consumed by the ship’s main engines, electric generators, and small 
boats 
The TYCOM also funds Squadron Commanders under his purview, allocating 
funds into Other and TAD cost pools.  Additionally, a new fund code (funding code 
second position “L”) [Ref. 1] was created and promulgated in September 2001 in an 
effort to more accurately capture and track AT/FP costs.  Atlantic and Pacific Fleet ships, 
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squadrons, training activities and maintenance activities are to use this funding code for 
all AT/FP-related costs, from additional fuel for small boat patrols around the ship while 
at anchor, to TAD costs associated with sending crewmembers to AT/FP training, to 
repair of AT/FP-related equipment.  While response from the fleet has been somewhat 
inconsistent to date, this is the type of measure TYCOMS are taking in their attempts to 
capture these myriad costs. 
 
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The objective of the research presented in this thesis is to help the reader gain a 
better understanding of the various recent changes in AT/FP requirements, the magnitude 
of the costs associated with them, and how these costs have grown.  Through analysis of 
these costs, this thesis will examine the feasibility of developing a cost estimation model 
that may assist the TYCOM in forecasting and budgeting for these costs. 
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
Through analysis of limited historical data, can a shipboard AT/FP cost estimation 
model be developed? 
2. Secondary Research Questions  
A.  Does meeting AT/FP funding requirements impact ships 
operations funding in other areas? 
B. How will having a better grasp on increasing shipboard AT/FP 
costs help Type Commanders in their budgeting cycle? 
C.  Do shipboard AT/FP requirement costs vary, and if so, why? 
 
D. SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
There have been a wide variety of new AT/FP requirements initiated throughout 
the Navy since the attack on USS COLE (DDG 67), all with associated costs.  Due to 
constraints on time and in the interest of a workable scope, this thesis will focus on those 
being placed upon surface ships.  Although the analysis presented is based upon data 
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collected on ships of the Atlantic Fleet (LANTFLT), it is anticipated that the 
methodology will be applicable to those of other fleets.  AT/FP costs incurred by shore 
installations as a result of meeting increased requirements will be presented and briefly 
discussed, but will not be included as part of the analysis.  Rather, the inclusion of these 
costs is intended to give the reader a better overall awareness of the types and magnitudes 
of costs being generated to meet AT/FP requirements today. 
 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this thesis consisted of the following steps: 
· A comprehensive literature review of pertinent AT/FP instructions, 
magazine and journal articles, government reports, internet-based 
materials and other information resources was conducted. 
· AT/FP cost data from Commander, Naval Surface Forces Atlantic 
(CNSL), Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
(COMNAVSEASYSCOM), Commander, Naval Region Northeast 
(CNRNE), Commander, Naval Region Mid-Atlantic (CNRMA), and 
Commander, Naval Region Southeast (CNRSE) were collected. 
· Telephone interviews with the CNSL comptroller’s office, 
COMNAVSEASYSCOM AT/FP equipment outfitting personnel, and 
offices of the three Region Commanders mentioned above were conducted 
in order to develop an understanding of the nature, scope and resulting 
costs of AT/FP measures currently being required of Atlantic Fleet ships 
and shore installations. 
· An analysis of shipboard AT/FP cost data was conducted to develop a cost 
estimation tool that may benefit CNSL in forecasting and budgeting for 
AT/FP costs in the future. 
· The shipboard AT/FP costs along with fiscal, logistical and technical 
considerations were synthesized into a cohesive, comprehensive 
description of the impact these AT/FP requirements are having on Atlantic 
Fleet ships. 
 
F. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH 
This thesis is intended primarily to benefit TYCOMs attempting to cope with the 
fiscal challenges of meeting AT/FP requirements.  Studies such as this may help 
TYCOMs to more accurately forecast these costs, enabling them to more effectively 
budget for them in the future.  One possible outcome of this research and analysis is a 
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modification to the existing ships operations funding model currently in use.  The 
discussion concerning the many facets of AT/FP costs – equipment, training, manpower, 
port visits, etc. is intended to give readers a more comprehensive view of the various 

















A. AT/FP MISSION ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) defines Force Protection as a 
security program designed to protect 
Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities and 
equipment in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned 
and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, 
operations security, and personal protective services and supported by 
intelligence, counter intelligence, law enforcement and other security 
programs [Ref. 2]. 
 The CJCS promulgated Joint Publication 3-07.2, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures for Antiterrorism,” from which the above definition is quoted.  The 
publication sets forth the tactics, techniques, and procedures governing the joint conduct 
of U.S. antiterrorism operations.  It provides a basis for understanding U.S. national 
policy and general objectives relating to antiterrorism, and explains important DOD and 
U.S. Government agency command and control relationships.  It also outlines basic U.S. 
military antiterrorism capabilities and provides guidance with respect to organizing, 
planning, and training for the employment of U.S. forces in interagency and multinational 
antiterrorism operations. 
The DOD is responsible for protecting its own personnel, ships, bases and 
equipment.  Based on these responsibilities, DOD has authored the following guidance: 
· DOD Directive 2000.12, “DOD Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) 
Program” 
This directive establishes the CJCS as the principal advisor and focal point 
responsible to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) for DOD AT/FP issues, and 
defines the AT/FP responsibilities of the Military Departments, Commanders of 
the Combatant Commands, and Defense agencies for DOD activities in their 
respective organizations.  Of note, it tasks the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller) with providing information and guidance to DOD components on 
displaying AT/FP resources within the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting 
System (PPBS) program and budget submissions. 
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· DOD Handbook O-2000.12-H, “Protection of DOD Personnel and 
Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence” 
This handbook builds upon the framework established in Directive  
2000.12 and provides installations with detailed information about implementing 
AT/FP standards and combating terrorist efforts. 
· DOD Instruction 2000.16, “DOD Antiterrorism Standards” 
This instruction implements AT/FP policy, further assigns responsibilities, 
and prescribes 31 antiterrorism program standards and procedures under the 
overarching guidance of 2000.12 for the protection of DOD personnel and assets 
from acts of terrorism. 
Naval TYCOMs have also promulgated guidance for establishing and maintaining 
AT/FP programs for the Commanders under their purview.  Commander, Naval Surface 
Forces Atlantic (CNSL) and Commander, Naval Surface Forces Pacific (CNSP) have 
updated guidance in the joint form of Commander Naval Surface Forces 
(COMNAVSURFOR) Instruction 3300.1, titled “Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) 
Program,” dated 27 January 2002. 
This instruction issues policy and procedures for the implementation of AT/FP 
programs aboard ships, outlining specific guidance in the following areas: 
· AT/FP Organization 
· Security Forces Afloat and Ship Security Watches 
· Qualifications 
· Small Arms Proficiency Courses 
· Training and Assessments 
· AT/FP Planning 
· AT/FP Reporting 
B. REPORTS ON THE STATUS OF AT/FP READINESS 
Many official reports have been published on the status of U.S. military AT/FP 
readiness.  The United States General Accounting Office (GAO) has authored some of 
the most comprehensive and critical of these.  They are summarized here: 
· GAO/NSIAD-97-207, “Combating Terrorism: Status of DOD Efforts to 
Protect Its Forces Overseas” (July 1997) 
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This report discusses terrorist attacks against U.S. military forces, 
including that of the Khobar Towers bombing, which killed 19 servicemen on 
June 25, 1996.  It asserts that the DOD lacks a comprehensive, consistent 
approach to antiterrorism that is based on common guidance, standards, and 
procedures.  It further states that the DOD does not know how much it is spending 
on antiterrorism because it cannot easily determine what costs are associated with 
its antiterrorism program.  The report also outlines a number of major initiatives 
DOD has undertaken to improve its program, including policy, organization, and 
funding changes.  The report’s recommendations include the adoption of 
standardized vulnerability assessments, more comprehensive physical security 
standards, and greater consistency in implementing AT/FP security measures. 
· GAO/T-NSIAD-98-44, “Combating Terrorism: Efforts to Protect U.S. 
Forces in Turkey and the Middle East” (October 1997) 
This report focuses on Commanders’ efforts to protect personnel overseas, 
and stresses the fact that because DOD relies heavily on the host nations for many 
of its security needs, efforts to reduce vulnerabilities often require extensive host 
nation support.  It reiterates the view that DOD still lacks a comprehensive and 
consistent approach to antiterrorism, and explains the complex security 
environment facing U.S. forces overseas.  It asserts that U.S. forces are constantly 
exposed to the threat of terrorist attack because executing the national security 
strategy requires their physical presence in many nations.  The report goes into 
further detail concerning the steps DOD has taken to improve its antiterrorism 
program, but points out that many vulnerabilities still remain. 
· GAO/NSIAD-00-181, “Combating Terrorism: Action Taken But 
Considerable Risks Remain for Forces Overseas” (July 2000) 
This is a follow-up to the above reports.  In it, the GAO asserts that 
limited funding and training have affected the ability of Commanders to correct 
known vulnerabilities.  It points out that the majority of funds used for AT/FP 
activities come from the services’ Operation and Maintenance (O&M) 
appropriations.  Actions the Joint Staff has taken to improve AT/FP programs are 
explained, as well as those taken by Geographic Combatant Commanders and 
Shore Installation Commanders.  The report discusses several vulnerabilities at 
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shore installations, and argues that the lack of sufficient funding remains part of 
the problem.  It also states that adequate training for AT/FP personnel is still 
problematic. 
· GAO-01-909, “Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve DOD 
Antiterrorism Program Implementation and Management” (September 
2001) 
This report, written in the wake of the terrorist attack on USS COLE but 
prior to those on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, discusses the 
effectiveness of DOD’s antiterrorism program.  It argues that the program’s 
effectiveness has been limited because DOD has not assessed vulnerabilities at all 
installations, systematically prioritized resource requirements, and developed a 
complete assessment of potential threats.  It goes on to emphasize that while 
services and individual installation commanders are taking steps to reduce their 
vulnerabilities, overall progress is difficult to measure because tracking systems 
are not in place.  It further explains that while DOD is taking steps to improve the 
antiterrorism program implementation and management to guide program 
execution and monitor results, limited funding has forced installation commanders 
to choose between AT/FP and other base operations projects. 
 Following the terrorist attack on USS COLE, on October 12, 2000, the Secretary 
of Defense (SECDEF) established a commission to review the attack within the context 
of DOD policies and procedures.  Chaired by General W.W. Crouch, U.S. Army 
(Retired) and Admiral H.W. Gehman, U.S. Navy (Retired), the commission’s charter was 
not to assess accountability, but rather to conduct an objective review of the attack.  
Submitted to SECDEF in January 2001, the commission’s report is comprehensive and 
focuses on the vulnerabilities associated with in-transit forces.  It contains 30 findings 
and 53 recommendations organized into the areas of Organization, AT/FP, Intelligence, 
Logistics, and Training.  The commission’s report emphasizes that the component 
commander is the “fulcrum” of the balance that weighs the benefits of engagement 
against the associated risks and costs.  The status of implementing the report’s 
recommendations is discussed in the next section. 
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C. CHANGES IN AT/FP POLICY, ORGANIZATION, AND FOCUS 
1. Establishment of JCS/J-34 
 SECDEF assigned CJCS to be his principal advisor on antiterrorism.  To 
support this added responsibility, the Chairman created a new office in the Joint Staff, 
The Deputy Directorate for Combating Terrorism.  Its mission is to  
Support the CJCS and assist the Combatant Commands and Services in 
the execution of their antiterrorism responsibilities across the full 
spectrum of operations in order to reduce the risk of the terrorist threat to 
DOD personnel, their families, facilities, and other DOD resources at 
home and abroad [Ref. 3]. 
The directorate is organized into three divisions; Plans, Operations, and Programs 
and Requirements 
2. Status of USS COLE Report Recommendations  
Since receiving the report from the COLE Commission, DOD has been 
aggressively implementing the recommendations contained in it.  The recommendations 
were organized into timelines for completion in three, six, nine, and 12-month 
increments.  To date, some 40 of the reports 53 recommendations have been 
implemented.  DOD Directive O-2000.16, “DOD Antiterrorism Standards” codified 
many of them into policy.  Significant actions taken include [Ref. 6]: 
· The “Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund,” established by 
SECDEF and managed by JCS/J-34, was increased from $15 million to 
$28.7 million for fiscal year (FY) 2001, and from $10 million to $25 
million for FYs 2003-2007.  The purpose of the fund is to support 
emergency, high-priority antiterrorism requirements not funded by the 
services. 
· Overall antiterrorism funding for FY 2001 was increased by $100 million 
to $3.5 billion.  This increase in funding reflects the importance DOD is 
placing on meeting AT/FP requirement costs. 
· AT/FP plans with complete listings of site-specific measures linked to 
Force Protection Conditions are to be classified. 
· AT/FP threat assessments are now required at least annually. 
· Combatant and Component Commanders are incorporating greater 
flexibility and more logistics options when scheduling missions. 
· The Joint Staff is dedicating additional resources to improve AT/FP 
training, including more comprehensive unit pre-deployment and recurring 
training curriculums. 
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3. Improvements in Shipboard AT/FP Equipment 
NAVSEASYSCOM, in a joint effort with CNSL and CNSP, has developed and 
promulgated an AT/FP Allowance Equipage List (AEL) for every ship in the Navy.  
Comprised of more than two-dozen separate line items, ships are now receiving AT/FP 
gear they had not in the past.  In addition, Battle Group deployers receive an “augment 
package” of equipment designed to complement that provided by the AEL.  At the time 
of this writing, the AEL and augment package were under review for consolidation. 
4. Manpower and Training 
In his guidance for 2002 titled “Fight And Win!” the Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO) states that the Navy will 
Increase the number of force protection-related professionals in the fleet 
(Master at Arms, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Security Force, etc.) from 
9,800 today to nearly 13,000 by the end of FY02, working towards a goal 
of nearly 17,000 by 2007, easing the burden on other Sailors. [Ref. 4] 
 Additionally, he tasks senior leaders to simultaneously invest in technologies that 
will increase the effectiveness of this investment in manpower.  He calls for a review and 
adjustment of the rules of engagement for defending against terrorists and measures to 
integrate and standardize the employment of force protection personnel to ensure uniform 
practices at home and overseas. 
 New AT/FP training has been developed and organized into four levels, to 
encompass virtually every member of the Navy.  With target audiences from recruits to 
senior officers, this new thrust in training is designed to increase awareness and 
capability throughout the Armed Forces. 
5. Funding 
The Department of the Navy (DON) received $33 million from its FY01 
Congressional Supplemental request.  $22 million of this was allotted to the Navy, the 
remaining $11 million to the Marine Corps.  A large portion ($7.6 million) of the Navy’s 
allowance went to fund the AEL mentioned earlier.  In its justification to Congress, the 
Navy cited the funds 
Address emergent antiterrorism and Force Protection requirements and 
will substantially mitigate recently recognized Force Protection 
vulnerabilities.  The attack on USS COLE triggered DOD to conduct 
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comprehensive reassessments of its antiterrorism and Force Protection 
posture [Ref. 5]. 
For FY02, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) increased AT/FP funding 
via Program Budget Decision 810 by $284 million for the Navy: (Operations and 
Maintenance (O&M)-$86 million, Other Procurement Navy (OPN)-$178 million, 
Research and Development (R&D)-$20 million).  Other services also received increased 
funding, totaling $255 million [Ref. 6]. 
6. U. S. Coast Guard Assistance 
In his guidance for 2002, the CNO tasked senior leaders to partner with the 
United States Coast Guard (USCG) and other Federal agencies to strengthen maritime 
intelligence, and to develop courses of action to reduce vulnerability.  In November 2001, 
Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT), in a joint announcement 
with the Commander of the Coast Guard Atlantic Area, stated that four Cyclone-Class 
Coastal Patrol (PC) ships were being assigned in support of homeland security operation 
NOBLE EAGLE.  Two additional PCs are to be assigned to the Pacific Coast.  The ships 
are to be used for coastal patrol and interdiction efforts with the USCG. 
The six PCs will be under tactical control of Coast Guard Area Commanders, 
while operational control will rest with Atlantic and Pacific Fleet Navy commands.  The 
PCs will continue to be manned and operated by Navy crews, but a team of specially 
trained Coast Guard law enforcement personnel will deploy on each of them while on 
maritime homeland security patrol to conduct boardings of vessels at sea, prior to the 
vessel’s entry into a U.S. port.  The PCs are also to be used to provide AT/FP for Naval 
ships, and escort commercial vessels in and out of U.S. ports [Ref. 7]. 
 
D. CURRENT SHIPS OPERATIONS FUNDING MODEL 
The ships operations funding model currently in use by CNSL is a fairly complex 
formula involving historical dollar costs and “growth” rates.  The formula for “Other” 
Operating Target (OPTAR) is presented below for illustrative purposes.  Those used for 




FY(n) Other OPTAR Base Total  - MTIS  + Incremental
Requirement Savings Requirement
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FY(n) MTIS Savings = Savings realized as a result of Material Turned-In To Stores 
(MTIS).  For example, if it is determined that a ship needed to carry eight of a certain part 
as opposed to 12, those extra four parts are turned back into the supply system, for which 
CNSL receives a “refund.” 
FY(n) Incremental Requirement  = Additional funds earmarked for specific purchases, 
and not included in the funding model, such as replacement of Chemical, Biological and 
Radiological (CBR) medicinal supplies and medical evacuations (MEDEVACs). 
FY(n-1) to FY(n) Price Growth = A growth or inflation term.  For example, if price 
growth were 2.7% from FY(n-1) to FY(n), this term would be 102.7%.  Some price 
growth terms used in the model are actually reductions, for instance 99%. 
FY(n) Ship Years = The number of ship years for that particular class of ship during 
FY(n).  For instance, if there were 10 “x-class” ships, all of which were expected to be 
fully operational for the entire fiscal year (n), there would be 10 ship years for “x-class” 
ships in FY(n). 
3-Year Average FY(n-1) Unit Cost = A “weighted” average of the “Other” OPTAR 
allotted per unit (ship of that particular class) for the previous three FYs, computed at the 
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FY(n-3) Adjusted OP-41 Unit Cost = 
FY(n-3) FY(n-3)
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FY(n-3) to FY(n-2) Price Growth = A growth or inflation term. 
FY(n-2) to FY(n-1) Price Growth = A growth or inflation term. 
FY(n-2) Adjusted OP-41 Unit Cost = Same as above for FY(n-3), using FY(n-2) terms. 
FY(n-1) Adjusted OP-41 Unit Cost = Same as above for FY(n-3), using FY(n-1) terms. 
FY(n-3) Total OP-41 Cost = The dollar amount of Other OPTAR actually spent for that 
class of ship for that FY.  Calculated at the end of each FY, the OP-41 is a budget exhibit 
document that CNSL generates. 
FY(n-3) MTIS Adjustment = The MTIS savings as described above. 
FY(n-3) Ship Years = The number of ship years in FY(n-3) for that particular ship class. 
 
E. SUMMARY 
The intent of this chapter was to set the stage and give the reader background 
information, in order to demonstrate where the services have been with respect to AT/FP, 
and where the Navy in particular appears to be going.  The presentation and discussion of 
the current ships operations funding model is intended to illustrate and emphasize the 
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complexity of the budgeting process TYCOMs must undergo when justifying their 
budget and allocating funds to the ships under their command.  The next chapter presents 
a synthesis of AT/FP-related costs and discusses TYCOM budgetary ramifications. 
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III. SYNTHESIS OF AT/FP COSTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The costs of providing Force Protection for Naval Forces are large, and rapidly 
growing.  They cover a wide variety of items, and are not always easy to capture for 
budgeting purposes.  The following sections will discuss three areas of AT/FP costs: 
those incurred by shore installations, by ships during port visits, and for the procurement 
of shipboard AT/FP equipment.  In addition, budgetary ramifications to the TYCOM due 
to increased Force Protection postures will be discussed. 
 
B. DESCRIPTION OF AT/FP COSTS 
1. Shore Installation AT/FP Costs 
A wide variety of AT/FP costs are incurred at Naval shore installations.  They 
include items such as equipment, pay, and training for security personnel, fuel and 
vehicles for increased security patrols, and upgrades to perimeter security measures such 
as fences and roadblocks.  Individual installations fall under the cognizance of a Naval 
Region Commander, whose duties include serving as the Regional Area Coordinator, 
providing Base Operations Support (BOS) infrastructure to Naval operating forces, other 
Naval organizations, and tenant commands.  With respect to AT/FP, they establish and 
revise policy, provide guidance, and establish uniform standards for the safeguarding of 
personnel, property, and material at the Naval shore installations and activities under their 
cognizance [Ref. 8]. 
Figure 3.1 below displays AT/FP cost data from three Naval Regions along the 
Atlantic Coast: Naval Region Northeast, Naval Region Mid-Atlantic, and Naval Region 
Southeast [Ref. 9].  In aggregate, the Commanders of these regions compile and report 
cost data with respect to providing AT/FP collected from 31 Naval bases and support 
































Figure 3.1: FY02 Naval Shore Installation AT/FP Costs 
 
2. Port Visit AT/FP Costs 
AT/FP costs incurred by ships during port visits include items such as additional 
security personnel on the pier or in small boats, perimeter security devices such as 
fencing or other physical barriers, and additional fuel required for the operation of the 
ship’s boats to secure a perimeter around the ship if at anchor.  These costs are paid for 
with money that comes from the TYCOM’s budget.  As the Force Protection measures 
required of ships during port visits grow in number and scope, so do the costs of meeting 
them.  The following graphs illustrate the growing cost of meeting prescribed Force 
Protection measures for Atlantic Fleet ships during port visits [Ref. 10].  Only those costs 
relating to Force Protection services provided to the visiting ship are displayed.  FY02 
figures for the average daily cost and average port visit cost are as of 6 March 2002. 
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Figure 3.2: Daily AT/FP Services Costs for LANTFLT Ship Port Visits 
 






















3. Shipboard AT/FP Equipment Costs 
NAVSEASYSCOM, working in conjunction with the Naval Criminal 
Investigative Service (NCIS), developed a shipboard AT/FP equipment AEL in order to 
outfit ships with needed Force Protection equipment.  This AEL (2-320024501, 502, or 
503, depending on the class of ship) contains 38 line items and was developed prior to the 
attack on USS COLE.  NAVSEASYSCOM received $12 million to begin the outfitting 
of all Naval Vessels with the equipment contained in the AEL.  Following the COLE 
attack, NAVSEASYSCOM personnel began coordinating with commanders of the 
Atlantic and Pacific Fleets to develop an augmentation package to the existing AEL.  The 
rationale used in developing the package was to ask the question: “What would a Battle 
Group or independently deploying ship in a foreign port with no infrastructure need to 
meet the increased AT/FP requirements?”  The result was an augmentation package 
containing some 23 line items, at an average cost of about $1.6 million per deploying 
Battle Group [Ref. 13]. 
Currently, the AT/FP AEL and augmentation package are under review for 
consolidation.  The consolidated package under consideration contains some 27 
individual line items, which ships of each class would receive in differing amounts, based 
on the size of the ship, crew, and other factors.  The total outfitting and distribution cost 
to the Navy for this equipment is projected to be $73.8 million [Ref. 14].  Funding for the 
equipment does not come from ship’s OPTARs, but from NAVSEASYSCOM’s initial 
equipment outfitting account, with contributions from OPNAV Resource Sponsors such 
as N76 (Surface Ships). 
 
C. BUDGETARY RAMIFICATIONS TO THE TYPE COMMANDER 
While the TYCOM is not responsible for shouldering all the myriad costs 
associated with meeting AT/FP requirements (for instance, he does not pay for AEL 
items, or those costs incurred by shore installations), he is responsible for many of them.  
The following paragraphs discuss four significant areas in which the rising cost of Force 
Protection comes directly out of his budget. 
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1. “Other” OPTAR and Force Protection Equipment Unfundeds  
As previously mentioned, “Other” OPTAR refers to funding provided to ships 
(and their parent squadrons) for consumable goods and services.  When a ship exhausts 
these consumable dollars, it must request an augment from the TYCOM.  Although the 
Force Protection equipment that ships are being outfitted with is enabling them to better 
provide for their own protection, it is not always enough.  When a ship deems some 
additional equipment is necessary, and the ship cannot afford to purchase the additional 
equipment it from its “Other” OPTAR, and other funding is not available, it is called an 
“unfunded requirement.”  Figure 3.4 below displays Force Protection equipment 
unfunded requirements for LANTFLT ships for FY02, as of December 2001.  The 
AUXILIARY group contains the AGF, AOE, and ARS ship classes.  The Cruiser-
Destroyer (CRUDES) group contains CG, DD, DDG, and FFG classes.  LCC, LHA, 
LHD, LPD, and LSD classes are encompassed by the AMPHIB group, while MCM, 
MHC, and PC classes make up the MINE WAR group.  The PC class was included in 
this group because its size and manning most closely resembles ships of this group.  The 
graph represents data from active as well as Naval Reserve Force (NRF) ships [Ref. 11]. 



















Figure 3.4: FY02 LANTFLT Force Protection Equipment Unfundeds 
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2. Increased Use Of Ship’s Assets For Force Protection 
While the Force Protection AEL provided ships with additional equipment at no 
cost to the ship or the TYCOM, existing shipboard equipment is being used at an 
increased tempo to meet Force Protection requirements.  An example is the ship’s Rigid 
Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB).  These small, diesel-powered boats are being operated at 
increased rates to patrol security perimeters around the ship while at anchor.  Increased 
operating hours translate into an increased need for regular maintenance supplies and 
repair parts.  Ships pay for these repair parts and maintenance supplies with dollars 
allotted them by the TYCOM. 
3. Increased TAD Funding Requirements 
In conjunction with the need for additional AT/FP equipment, additional training 
is required to enable Sailors to use it effectively.  Ships send crewmembers to training, 
which is generally of no cost to the ship.  However, the cost of transportation, lodging 
and meals for these shipboard teams as they attend the training is not.  If the training is 
not offered at the ship’s homeport, the ship must bear these costs out of their TAD 
account.  Additionally, the ship’s parent squadron is required to inspect and certify the 
readiness of the Security Teams of each of the ships under its cognizance.  The squadron 
and its ships are not necessarily co- located in the same homeport.  For instance, The 
squadron headquarters may be located in Norfolk, Virginia, while some of its ships are 
homeported in Mayport, Florida, or Pascagoula, Mississippi.  While squadrons are 
allotted some amount of funding for this, the rising costs of TAD to meet increased 
AT/FP training requirements remains a concern for the TYCOM. 
4. Phased Replacement of AT/FP Equipment 
As mentioned before, AT/FP equipment is provided to ships at no cost to them or 
the TYCOM.  However, once the equipment wears out, breaks down or is expended, it is 
the responsibility of the ship to replace it – this is known as “phased replacement.”  The 
cost of phased replacement of AT/FP equipment is of concern to the TYCOM, because 
his budget is where the ships under his purview get the dollars to carry it out.  While 
some of the items in the consolidated AT/FP AEL and augment package are inexpensive 
and fairly robust - $40 for a waterline security light – others are considerably more 
expensive, sophisticated, and fragile ($25,000 for a hand-held explosive detector).  This 
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facet of the cost of providing Force Protection is perhaps of lesser immediate concern 
than others, but as ships crews use more of the equipment with more regularity, it will 
become an increasingly important consideration for the TYCOM. 
 
D. SUMMARY 
The TYCOM is responsible for a considerable portion of the cost of providing 
shipboard AT/FP.  He must budget for items such as the additional costs of port visits, 
repair parts and equipment maintenance supplies, TAD for training, and eventually, the 
phased replacement of equipment.  As the TYCOM’s AT/FP “bill” grows, funding for 
other things not AT/FP-related may be reduced, delayed, or even canceled.  If care is not 
taken, whether these “other things” are Quality of Life (QOL) programs for Sailors or 
additional repair parts for a weapon system, footing the bill for increased Force 
Protection conditions may have the unintended consequence of adversely affecting the 
future readiness of our forces. 
The next chapter presents a shipboard AT/FP cost estimation model.  Component 
parts as well as limitations of the model are discussed.  Based upon analysis of historical 
and current cost data, the model may help Type Commanders to forecast and thus budget 




























































IV. SHIPBOARD AT/FP COST ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Shipboard Antiterrorism/Force Protection costs are incurred through various 
requirements.  TAD and travel costs are generated by the training requirements for 
crewmembers.  The TYCOM incurs costs for added security measures while ships 
conduct port visits.  Phased replacement of AT/FP equipment generates another set of 
costs the TYCOM must deal with.  The following sections will introduce a shipboard 
AT/FP cost estimation model, explain its component parts, the results obtained, and 
limitations of the model. 
 
B. SHIPBOARD AT/FP COST ESTIMATION MODEL 
A shipboard AT/FP cost estimation model must attempt to capture the costs 
mentioned above for a given fiscal year.  The cost model can be represented as follows: 
AT/FP Cost = 
AT/FP TAD Port Visit AT/FP Phased AT/FP
and Travel  + AT/FP  + Replacement  + Incremental
Costs Costs Costs Costs
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1. AT/FP TAD and Travel Costs 
This term in the equation captures those costs associated with sending 
crewmembers off the ship to attend required Force Protection training.  It contains  
funding for travel, lodging and meals while attending this training, the majority of which 
is conducted at Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek, Virginia.  While ships homeported 
there or at other bases in the Norfolk area may not incur large costs, those generated by 
ships homeported elsewhere will invariably be much greater.  Table 4.1 below 
summarizes estimated costs for FY02 compiled for LANTFLT ships.  These data were 
provided by the CNSL Comptroller’s office and represent estimated costs based on the 




Ship Number Class Per Ship
Class In Class Allowance Allowance
AGF 1 $11,000 $11,000
AOE 4 $17,000 $4,250
ARS 2 $2,000 $1,000
CG 14 $46,000 $3,286
DD 11 $21,000 $1,909
DDG 19 $58,000 $3,053
FFG 20 $30,000 $1,500
LCC 1 $2,000 $2,000
LHA 2 $11,000 $5,500
LHD 4 $26,000 $6,500
LPD 5 $10,000 $2,000
LSD 7 $14,000 $2,000
MCM 14 $56,000 $4,000
MCS 1 $7,000 $7,000
MHC 12 $15,000 $1,250
PC 9 $13,000 $1,444
TOTAL $339,000  
Table 4.1: Estimated AT/FP TAD and Travel Requirements for LANTFLT Ships 
 
2. Port Visit AT/FP Costs 
 This term includes those AT/FP costs incurred by ships dur ing port visits.  
Additional security measures provided to the visiting ship by the host country such as 
guards, fencing, barriers and floating booms are reflected here.  The outfitting of Force 
Protection allowance equipage list items and the AT/FP training now required of ships 
may mitigate some of these costs, however, some portion will undoubtedly remain.  Data 
for this term were extracted from the Cost Reporting, Analysis, and Forecasting Tool 
(CRAFT) database, designed and maintained by Naval Region Contracting Center 
(NRCC) Naples, Italy.  Reports to the database are included in husbanding services 
contracts in the Navy’s Second, Fifth, and Sixth Fleets.  A similar database, maintained 
by NRCC Singapore, includes port visit cost data on the Navy’s Third and Seventh 
Fleets. 
 Force Protection services cost data for each class of ship in the Atlantic Fleet were 
compiled for each quarter of fiscal years 1998 through 2001, and for the first quarter of 
fiscal year 2002.  Due to the increased Force Protection requirements following the attack 
on USS COLE on October 12, 2000, data for fiscal years prior to that (1998 through 
2000) were deemed less relevant by the researcher for the purpose of estimating port visit 
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AT/FP costs in the current Force Protection environment.  Table 4.2 below summarizes 
costs incurred by Atlantic Fleet ships for the four quarters of FY01 and the first quarter of 
FY02. 
Ship 1Q FY01 2Q FY01 3Q FY01 4Q FY01 1Q FY02 FY02
Class $ Spent $ Spent $ Spent $ Spent $ Spent Projection
AGF $1,729 $348 $0 $0 $0 $4,154
AOE $0 $0 $0 $3,307 $2,247 $11,108
ARS $0 $8,760 $0 $20,033 $0 $57,586
CG $11,304 $4,060 $5,978 $37,567 $9,121 $54,424
DD $900 $2,392 $3,515 $10,495 $4,556 $17,486
DDG $0 $25,871 $9,841 $16,173 $22,709 $74,594
FFG $0 $7,056 $10,185 $30,309 $47,139 $94,689
LCC $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
LHA $4,393 $2,589 $2,955 $0 $0 $13,249
LHD $0 $186 $12,903 $27,886 $0 $54,633
LPD $0 $899 $68,886 $19,970 $0 $119,673
LSD $1,075 $18,663 $15,093 $16,326 $0 $51,157
MCM $0 $636 $3,260 $20,796 $0 $32,923
MCS $0 $0 $4,445 $0 $0 $0
MHC $0 $1,985 $13,407 $0 $0 $30,784
PC $0 $2,580 $2,918 $7,957 $0 $17,940
TOTAL $19,401 $76,025 $153,386 $210,819 $85,772 $634,401  
Table 4.2: Port Visit Force Protection Services Costs for LANTFLT Ships 
 
The shaded cells in the AGF (4Q FY01), DDG (3Q FY01), and LPD (3Q FY01) 
rows indicate periods in which the data were smoothed for analysis purposes.  For each of 
these three ship classes, the Force Protection services cost for a single port visit to 
Istanbul, Turkey during that timeframe was removed from the data due to its peculiar 
circumstances.  Force Protection services costs for each of these Istanbul port visits were: 
· AGF: One ship, four days (9–12 August 2001) at a cost of $56,900 
· DDG: One ship, one day (9 June 2001) at a cost of $33,000 
· LPD: One ship, one day (8 June 2001) at a cost of $33,000 
Though not to be discounted, these Force Protection costs for a single port visit 
were considered to be atypical by the researcher when compared to the costs incurred by 
those ship classes in other port visits.  The exorbitant nature of these costs skewed the 
computed average quarterly cost, which in turn resulted in an uncharacteristically high 
FY02 projection.  For this reason, these three data points were removed during the 
calculation of the average quarterly cost and the FY02 projection. 
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It is emphasized, however, that these ships did incur the costs outlined above.  
Ships planning future port visits to Istanbul will incur costs of this magnitude and thus 
must take them into account.  Because they were removed from the data for the 
calculation of the average quarterly cost as well as the FY02 projection, TYCOMs 
budgeting for visits to this port will incur much greater Force Protection services costs 
than the model predicts. 
Dividing the dollar amounts spent per quarter for port visit Force Protection 
services by the number of days spent in port during those visits gives an average daily 
cost per quarter.  The following three graphs represent these average daily costs, 
computed for the AUXILIARY, CRUDES, and AMPHIB groups.  To further illustrate 
the atypical nature of the costs discussed above, data from Istanbul port visits are 
included in the graphs. 
































Figure 4.1: Port Visit AT/FP Costs for LANTFLT AUXILIARY, Including AGF Port 



































Figure 4.2: Port Visit AT/FP Costs for LANTFLT CRUDES, Including DDG Port 
Visit to Istanbul, Turkey 
 































Figure 4.3: Port Visit AT/FP Costs for LANTFLT AMPHIB, Including LPD Port 
Visit to Istanbul, Turkey 
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The “FY02 Projection” column in Table 4.2 was formulated by averaging the 
previous quarters for each ship class (excluding the Istanbul visit data for the reasons 
described) in order to compute an average quarterly cost, representative for that class of 
ship.  This figure was then multiplied by four to arrive at an estimated cost per class for 
the entire fiscal year. 
Cells in the table containing zeros were treated as missing numbers and were not 
considered when computing the quarterly averages.  This was done to arrive at a more 
meaningful, representative quarterly average of the AT/FP services costs being incurred 
during port visits.  A zero in Table 4.2 does not necessarily mean no port visits were 
conducted during that quarter - rather, it simply means that no port visit AT/FP services 
costs were documented or reported into the database.  For example, the four LANTFLT 
AOE’s conducted 33 port visits for a total of 111 days inport during FY01.  Of these, 
AT/FP services costs were reported into the database for only two of them, for a total of 
four days inport. 
Thus, AT/FP services costs were reported into the database for less than seven 
percent of the port visits conducted by this ship class.  Based on data such as these and 
conversations with the SURFLANT Force Comptroller, it is the belief of the  researcher 
that not all AT/FP costs being incurred are being reported, or documented in databases 
such as CRAFT.  Due to the limited data available, the port visit AT/FP costs term of the 
model is likely under-estimated, perhaps even significantly so.  For these reasons, zeros 
appearing in Table 4.2 were treated as missing numbers, and were not considered during 
the quarterly average calculation.  The FY02 projection for the MCS class (a single ship, 
USS INCHON) is zero because it is to be decommissioned during that timeframe [Ref. 
12], and no further port visits are scheduled. 
The following graphs represent average daily port visit AT/FP costs, computed 
for each ship class.  In these graphs, the AT/FP costs incurred during the three port visits 
to Istanbul were removed for the reasons previously discussed, as were the days spent 
there. 
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Figure 4.4: Port Visit AT/FP Costs for LANTFLT AUXILIARY, Excluding AGF 
Port Visit to Istanbul, Turkey 
 




















Figure 4.5: Port Visit AT/FP Costs for LANTFLT CRUDES, Excluding DDG Port 
Visit to Istanbul, Turkey 
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Figure 4.6: Port Visit AT/FP Costs for LANTFLT AMPHIB, Excluding LPD Port 
Visit to Istanbul, Turkey 
 




















Figure 4.7: Port Visit AT/FP Costs for LANTFLT MINE WAR 
 
3. AT/FP Phased Replacement Costs 
This term of the model captures the cost of the phased replacement of equipment 
contained in the Force Protection AEL being distributed to ships.  In order to arrive at a 
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more refined estimate of these costs, The AEL was divided into “cost groups,” as 
determined by the researcher, based on the unit cost of each item.  When analyzing the 
unit costs of the items contained in the AEL, they logically fell into four groups as 
follows: group one contains ten items ranging in cost from $6 to $80, group two contains 
nine items between $150 and $570, group three includes five items costing $2,000 to 
$5,675, and group four contains three items ranging in cost from $12,400 to $104,500.  
Each cost group was then assigned an average lifetime based on the researcher’s estimate 
of the likely shipboard life of the items in that group: two years for group one, four years 
for group two, six years for group three, and eight years for group four.  Finally, the unit 
cost for the items in each group was multiplied by the quantity of that item assigned to 
each ship, which was then multiplied by the number of ships in that class.  These cost 
group totals were then divided by the lifetimes assigned to each group, and summed to 
arrive at an annual phased replacement cost per class.  For each ship class, the annual cost 
was divided by the number of ships in the class to give the annual cost per ship.  Table 
4.3 below summarizes the results.  Annual costs for the MCS class are zero for the reason 
cited above.  The Force Protection AEL and associated item unit costs were provided by 
NAVSEASYSCOM. 
Ship Number AEL Cost AEL Cost Annual Cost Annual Cost
Class In Class Per Ship Per Class Per Ship Per Class
AGF 1 $210,641 $210,641 $34,531 $34,531
AOE 4 $211,307 $845,229 $34,676 $138,705
ARS 2 $192,694 $385,387 $29,834 $59,667
CG 14 $210,557 $2,947,803 $34,489 $482,844
DD 11 $210,557 $2,316,132 $34,489 $379,378
DDG 19 $210,557 $4,000,590 $34,489 $655,289
FFG 20 $210,557 $4,211,148 $34,489 $689,778
LCC 1 $447,116 $447,116 $64,825 $64,825
LHA 2 $474,633 $949,265 $68,531 $137,063
LHD 4 $474,633 $1,898,531 $68,531 $274,126
LPD 5 $446,787 $2,233,937 $64,181 $320,904
LSD 7 $446,912 $3,128,386 $64,243 $449,703
MCM 14 $75,684 $1,059,576 $11,448 $160,276
MCS 1 $179,163 $179,163 $0 $0
MHC 12 $81,359 $976,308 $12,394 $148,729
PC 9 $72,276 $650,484 $10,447 $94,021
TOTAL $26,439,696 $4,089,838  
Table 4.3: LANTFLT Ship Estimated AT/FP Equipment Phased Replacement Costs 
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4. AT/FP Incremental Costs 
This term is meant to capture those items not included in the previous terms, and 
to allow for the limitations of the model.  It includes AT/FP costs that are incurred, but 
not budgeted for, so that they may be included in the model for subsequent fiscal years.  
Likely future items included in this term are: 
· Additional repair part and depot level repair dollars expended due to the 
increased use of existing assets, such as Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats 
· Additional fuel requirements due to increased small boat operations 
· Additional funding for small arms ammunition, as a result of the increased 
training required of ship’s force 
As discussed in Chapter I, use of the new fund code for AT/FP expenditures should help 
TYCOMs capture these myriad elements for inclusion into this term of the cost 
estimation model.  In developing the model, Force Protection unfunded requirements 
made up this term.  Table 4.4 below summarizes FY02 Force Protection unfundeds as 
collected by CNSL for the ships under its cognizance. 
Ship Number Unfunded Unfunded
Class In Class Per Ship Per Class
AGF 1 $71,847 $71,847
AOE 4 $6,025 $24,100
ARS 2 $4,474 $8,948
CG 14 $11,388 $159,432
DD 11 $11,937 $131,307
DDG 19 $8,145 $154,755
FFG 20 $8,666 $173,320
LCC 1 $4,200 $4,200
LHA 2 $23,101 $46,202
LHD 4 $18,203 $72,812
LPD 5 $2,714 $13,570
LSD 7 $3,568 $24,976
MCM 14 $3,061 $42,854
MCS 1 $0 $0
MHC 12 $3,841 $46,092
PC 9 $3,061 $27,549
TOTAL $1,001,964  
Table 4.4: FY02 LANTFLT Ship AT/FP Unfunded Requirements 
 
No data were taken for the MCS class due to its planned decommissioning.  Data for the 
PC class appear in the table, although CNSL was not the cognizant TYCOM at the time 
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of the data call.  MCM class figures were used as what the researcher reasoned was the 
most likely approximation. 
 
C. COST ESTIMATION MODEL RESULTS 
When the four terms of the cost estimation model are combined, a total dollar 
figure for Force Protection requirements per ship class is obtained.  Table 4.5 below 
summarizes the results. 
Ship Number TAD and Port Phased Incremental Class Per Ship
Class In Class Travel Visits Replacement Costs Total Total
AGF 1 $11,000 $4,154 $34,531 $71,847 $121,532 $121,532
AOE 4 $17,000 $11,108 $138,705 $24,101 $190,914 $47,729
ARS 2 $2,000 $57,586 $59,667 $8,947 $128,200 $64,100
CG 14 $46,000 $54,424 $482,844 $159,438 $742,706 $53,050
DD 11 $21,000 $17,486 $379,378 $131,306 $549,171 $49,925
DDG 19 $58,000 $74,594 $655,289 $154,747 $942,630 $49,612
FFG 20 $30,000 $94,689 $689,778 $173,327 $987,794 $49,390
LCC 1 $2,000 $0 $64,825 $4,200 $71,025 $71,025
LHA 2 $11,000 $13,249 $137,063 $46,201 $207,513 $103,757
LHD 4 $26,000 $54,633 $274,126 $72,812 $427,571 $106,893
LPD 5 $10,000 $119,673 $320,904 $13,568 $464,145 $92,829
LSD 7 $14,000 $51,157 $449,703 $24,974 $539,834 $77,119
MCM 14 $56,000 $32,923 $160,276 $42,853 $292,051 $20,861
MCS 1 $7,000 $0 $0 $0 $7,000 $7,000
MHC 12 $15,000 $30,784 $148,729 $46,091 $240,604 $20,050
PC 9 $13,000 $17,940 $94,021 $27,550 $152,511 $16,946
TOTAL $339,000 $634,401 $4,089,838 $1,001,962 $6,065,201  
Table 4.5: Results of the Shipboard AT/FP Cost Estimation Model 
 
As displayed in Table 4.5, the annual cost to CNSL, as predicted by the model, is 
over $6 million (had the Istanbul data been included in the port visit term, the amount 
forecasted by the model would have been $6.2 million).  This is the approximate cost of 
shipboard AT/FP to be budgeted for.  In determining this dollar amount, the model 
assumes that the number and length of port visits per ship class will remain 
approximately constant.  It also assumes the Force Protection AEL will be fully funded 
and implemented for all ship classes, and that the phased replacement of this equipment 
will occur as scheduled by the cost groups the AEL items were placed into.  Although the 
model was designed to capture the major AT/FP cost drivers, it, like all cost estimation 
34 
models, has limitations.  Factors that will affect the actual dollar amount forecasted by 
the model include: 
· Changes in shipboard operations tempo (OPTEMPO) 
· Changes in the number, duration, and geographic location of port visits 
· Changes in the number of ships in each class 
· Prolonged changes to the Force Protection Condition (FPCON) 
· The actual shipboard life of Force Protection AEL items 
· When the phased replacement of AEL items begins 
· Yearly inflation rates 
 
D. SUMMARY 
 The cost of shipboard AT/FP is large and difficult to accurately quantify.  It 
encompasses a wide variety of variables, including crew training, security during port 
visits, and equipment phased replacement.  Other costs that are not as easily captured 
include the additional maintenance and repair due to increased use of existing equipment, 
additional fuel requirements to allow for increased small boat operations, and the small 
arms ammunition required for increased shipboard security personnel training.  While 
some of these costs may be easily compiled and calculated, others are more subtle and 
will require the TYCOMs who must forecast and budget for them to employ innovative 
techniques to do so. 
 This chapter has introduced a viable shipboard AT/FP cost estimation model and 
explained its component parts, as well as its limitations.  It was designed to capture the 
major shipboard AT/FP cost drivers, and cost elements of AT/FP that are more difficult 
to quantify.  Through synthesis of historic and current cost data, it provides a reasonably 
accurate forecast of the annual cost of meeting current shipboard AT/FP requirements.  
Although most of the data used in developing the model are specific to ships of the 
Atlantic Fleet (the Force Protection AEL applies to all naval vessels), the methodology 
employed in the formulation of the model is such that it is likely applicable to other U.S. 
Navy fleets as well. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. REVIEW OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Through Analysis of Limited Historical Data, Can a Shipboard 
AT/FP Cost Estimation Model be Developed? 
The model developed by the researcher is as follows: 
AT/FP Cost = 
AT/FP TAD Port Visit AT/FP Phased AT/FP
and Travel  + AT/FP  + Replacement  + Incremental
Costs Costs Costs Costs
æ ö æ ö æ ö æ ö
ç ÷ ç ÷ ç ÷ ç ÷
ç ÷ ç ÷ ç ÷ ç ÷
ç ÷ ç ÷ ç ÷ ç ÷
è ø è ø è ø è ø
 
The model is designed to capture the major elements of shipboard Antiterrorism/Force 
Protection costs, and is based on analysis of limited existing cost data, as well as 
estimates developed by the Force Comptroller, Atlantic Surface Fleet.  Results obtained 
indicate the annual cost that should be budgeted for ships of the Atlantic Fleet is 
approximately $6 million.  Through synthesis of historic and current cost data, it provides 
a reasonably accurate forecast of the annual cost of meeting current shipboard AT/FP 
requirements.  Although most of the data used in developing the model is specific to 
ships of the Atlantic Fleet, the methodology employed in the formulation of the model is 
such that it is likely to be applicable to other U.S. Navy fleets as well. 
2. Does Meeting AT/FP Funding Requirements Impact Ships Operations 
Funding in Other Areas? 
The Type Commander is responsible for a considerable portion of the cost of 
providing shipboard AT/FP.  He must budget for items such as the additional cost of port 
visits, repair parts and equipment maintenance supplies, TAD for training, and 
eventually, the phased replacement of equipment.  As the TYCOM’s AT/FP “bill” grows, 
funding for other things not AT/FP-related may be reduced, delayed, or even canceled.  If 
care is not taken, whether these “other things” are QOL programs for Sailors or 
additional repair parts for a weapon system, footing the bill for increased Force 
Protection conditions may have the unintended consequence of adversely affecting the 
future readiness of our forces.  Data regarding items not funded due specifically to 
funding AT/FP items instead are unavailable at the time of this writing, and is an area of 
suggested further research. 
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3. How Will Having a Better Grasp on Increasing Shipboard AT/FP 
Costs help Type Commanders in Their Budgeting Cycle? 
The ability to accurately forecast and budget for funding requirements is essential 
to a Type Commander.  He must be able to generate an accurate, detailed budget based 
upon the requirements of commanders under his cognizance, and perhaps just as 
importantly, be able to defend its contents to his superiors.  As the cost of meeting 
shipboard AT/FP requirements grows, so will his concern about being able to fund it 
appropriately.  Through the collection and analysis of specific AT/FP cost data, the 
TYCOM will be better equipped to formulate budgets which more accurately reflect the 
increasing nature of these costs, and be armed with more complete information to defend 
his budget when called upon to do so. 
4. Do Shipboard AT/FP Requirement Costs Vary, and If So, Why? 
Shipboard AT/FP requirement costs vary with several factors, including ship 
class, port visits, and home port.  The class of ship determines which items of the Force 
Protection AEL it carries, as well as how many of those items it is authorized.  This in 
turn will determine the phased replacement cost of these items.  As illustrated in Table 
4.3, the estimated annual phased replacement cost of AT/FP equipment for Atlantic Fleet 
CG-class ships is $482,844, while that for MCM-class ships is $160,276.  While there are 
14 ships of each class in the Atlantic Fleet, the amount and type of equipment they are 
each issued is quite different. 
The ship class also determines the number of crewmembers required to undergo 
special Force Protection training, which in turn determines the level of TAD and travel 
funding required.  Smaller classes such as MCM, MHC, and PC have smaller crews, and 
hence must send fewer crewmembers to attend this training.  The reverse is true for larger 
classes such as LHA and LHD. 
The number, duration, and geographic location of port visits also have a major 
impact on shipboard AT/FP costs.  The port visits to Istanbul, Turkey described in 
Chapter IV (three single-ship visits for a total of six days inport, at a cost of $122,900) 
are good examples of how inordinate the AT/FP service costs can be. 
The ship’s homeport will also affect the AT/FP costs it incurs.  If the ship is not 
homeported near a training activity offering the special AT/FP training it requires, it must 
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expend more TAD and travel dollars than do ships that are.  Additionally, Squadron 
Commanders who are not collocated with all of the ships under their cognizance will 
incur more of these costs than those who are, as they are required to certify the AT/FP 
proficiency of the ships under their command. 
 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The cost of meeting Force Protection requirements is on the rise.  As shipboard 
AT/FP costs increase, they become an element of greater concern to the Type 
Commander, who must attempt to forecast and budget for them.  This thesis presents a 
viable shipboard AT/FP cost estimation model based upon historical and current data 
analysis.  Costs captured by the model are AT/FP TAD and travel expenses, costs of 
AT/FP services during port visits, the phased replacement cost of AT/FP equipment, and 
any incremental costs incurred, but not included in the previous terms. 
As forecasted by the model, the annual cost of meeting current shipboard AT/FP 
requirements for ships of the Atlantic Fleet is approximately $6 million.  Several factors 
may affect the costs predicted by the model, including changes in shipboard OPTEMPO, 
the number, duration, and geographic location of port visits, the number of ships per 
class, current FPCON, actual shipboard life of Force Protection AEL items and the rate of 
phased replacement, and inflation rates from one year to the next. 
Use of the cost estimation model will help Type Commanders more accurately 
forecast and thus budget for these costs.  Perhaps more importantly, it will help bring to 
light the importance of capturing the myriad costs associated with meeting shipboard 
AT/FP requirements in today’s Force Protection environment. 
 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Adopt the 3-Year Averaging Model When Sufficient Data Exists 
The current ships operations funding model as presented in Chapter II utilizes a 
three-year weighted average to forecast funding requirements for the next fiscal year.  
Although this amount of historical cost data does not yet exist for shipboard AT/FP costs, 
aligning the shipboard Force Protection cost model with the ships operations funding 
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model currently in use when sufficient data become available may yield more accurate 
forecasts and serve to further streamline the ships operations funding process. 
2. Re-emphasize the Importance of AT/FP Fund Code Use 
To ensure the various AT/FP-related costs being incurred are being reported 
correctly, Type Commanders should consider periodically (perhaps quarterly) restating to 
ships, training activities, and maintenance activities the importance of utilizing the “L” 
fund code promulgated in September 2001.  Stressing the appropriate use of this fund 
code to all subordinate commands will serve to reinforce its importance, accelerate its 
adoption, and help to ensure that accurate and complete AT/FP cost data are being 
captured. 
3. Separate the AT/FP Fund Code Into More Discrete Levels  
The promulgation and adoption of the AT/FP fund code will help to ensure 
AT/FP costs are being captured, but it may not be enough.  As is, the Type Commander is 
unable to discern why a cost reported under the “L” fund code was incurred – for the 
purchase of equipment, repairs or maintenance, or for AT/FP services rendered.  Further 
breaking down the code into more discrete levels may better serve Type Commanders in 
their efforts to discover where the truly significant AT/FP costs lie.  Possible sub-
categories include: 
· The purchase of AT/FP equipment 
· Repairs to equipment due to AT/FP-related use 
· Services rendered, such as additional measures required during port visits 
· AT/FP TAD, travel, and training 
Although the promulgation and adoption by the fleet of additional fund codes 
presents its own challenges – training, existing system capacity, etc. – a finer breakdown 
of the nature of AT/FP costs incurred will assist analysts and those involved in budgeting 
in more accurately identifying where AT/FP dollars are being spent.  This in turn will 





D. SUGGESTED AREA OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. Unfunded Requirements as a Result of Paying the AT/FP “Bill” 
As DON budgets rise and fall with the passage of time, it may be worthwhile to 
study what, if anything, is being unfunded or under-funded, due specifically to meeting 
AT/FP funding requirements.  Should a sharp decline in funding occur, Navy leadership 
would be forced to make difficult decis ions with regard to the allocation of suddenly 
scarce dollars. 
2. The Ship Operations Funding Model Itself 
The current ship operations funding model has been in use for about six years.  A 
study to determine the accuracy of estimations made and whether or not costs forecasted 
by the model are truly indicative of those actually being incurred may help to shed light 
on the assumptions made about where dollars are needed, and where they should be 
allocated. 
3. The Effect of AT/FP Requirements on Existing Ship’s Equipment 
As the fleet meets increased AT/FP requirements, additional stress is placed on 
existing equipment.  Small boats are logging additional operating hours, small arms being 
issued to watchstanders are undergoing heavier use, and some damage control equipment 
may be experiencing increased use.  The cumulative effect of this increased use of 
equipment includes additional maintenance and repairs, which translates to additional 
dollars needed for maintenance supplies, repair parts and perhaps depot level repair.  As 
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APPENDIX A. LIST OF ACRONYMS 
AEL    Allowance Equipage List 
AT/FP    Antiterrorism/Force Protection 
BOS    Base Operations Support 
CBR    Chemical, Biological, Radiological 
CINCLANTFLT  Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet 
CJCS    Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 
CNO    Chief of Naval Operations 
CNRMA   Commander, Naval Region Mid-Atlantic 
CNRNE   Commander, Naval Region Northeast 
CNRSE   Commander, Naval Region Southeast 
CNSL    Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet 
CNSP    Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet 
COMNAVSEASYSCOM Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
COMNAVSURFOR  Commander, Naval Surface Forces 
CRAFT   Cost Reporting, Analysis, and Forecasting Tool 
CRUDES   Cruiser-Destroyer 
DOD    Department of Defense 
DON    Department of the Navy 
FPCON   Force Protection Condition 
FY    Fiscal Year 
GAO    General Accounting Office 
GAO/NSIAD General Accounting Office/National Security and 
International Affairs Division 
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JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff 
LANTFLT Atlantic Fleet 
MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation 
MTIS Material Turned- in to Stores 
NCIS Naval Criminal Investigative Service 
NRCC Naval Region Contracting Center 
NRF Naval Reserve Force 
O&M Operations and Maintenance 
OPN Other Procurement, Navy 
OPTAR Operating Target 
OPTEMPO Operations Tempo 
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 
PPBS Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System 
QOL Quality of Life 
R&D Research and Development 
RHIB Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat 
SECDEF Secretary of Defense 
TAD Temporary Assigned Duty 
TYCOM Type Commander 
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